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Abstract 
In recent years there has been a growing literature that analyses the threat which 
Chinese exports pose to the exports of other developing countries. The paper provides a 
critique of the standard measures of export similarity which have been used to estimate 
the threat from China in these studies. Two alternative indices, the static and the 
dynamic index of competitive threat, are developed and estimated for 18 developing 
countries and compared with estimates for the standard measures. It is shown that the 
latter tend to underestimate the extent to which countries are threatened by China. They 
also distort both the rankings of countries according to the extent to which they face 
competition from China and the direction of change in the competitive threat over time.  
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1 Introduction 
China’s rapid growth and increased openness over the past quarter century have led to it 
emerging as a key player in the global economy in the early twenty-first century. GDP 
has grown at over 9 per cent per annum since 1980 so that China is now the world’s 
fourth largest economy at market exchange rates. Its share of world trade has risen over 
the same period from less than 1 per cent in 1980 to over 6.5 per cent in 2005 making it 
the third largest trading economy. Although China’s growth performance is not that 
different to Japan’s and the Asian newly industrializing countries’ at similar stages of 
their development, what does make China potentially more significant in terms of its 
impact on the world economy in future is the sheer size of the country.  
What will be the effect of China’s increased global significance on the rest of the 
world? China has over the past decade accounted for about 13 per cent of world 
economic growth (Winters and Yusuf 2007: table 1.1) and its rapid growth has been an 
important source of additional demand for exporters. This is particularly true for 
primary commodity exporters, including a number of African and Latin American 
countries, who have benefited from both increased volumes of exports to China and 
improvements in their terms of trade as a result of increased commodity prices 
(UNCTAD 2005: ch. 2; IMF 2006: ch. 5). 
There is, however, a downside to the global expansion of China for some developing 
countries, with concern being expressed about the impact that Chinese competition is 
having on their exports. The problems are particularly acute for countries which 
developed significant textile and garment exports under the MFA’s quota system. With 
the end of the MFA they are exposed to direct competition from China which they may 
be poorly placed to meet. Reports are already coming in of plant closures in countries as 
far apart as Bangladesh, El Salvador and Lesotho (see McGhie, Kwatra and Davison 
2004 on Bangladesh; Thompson 2005 on Central America; Peta 2005 on Lesotho).  
Nor are the problems confined to countries that have specialized in unskilled labour-
intensive manufactures. As Chinese industry becomes more technologically 
sophisticated, its range of exports is broadening and also posing a threat to 
middle-income exporters of more capital- or skill-intensive products such as Mexico 
and Malaysia. Chinese exports of some agricultural products are also on the rise, for 
example, with Chinese apples affecting markets for countries such as Chile and South 
Africa. 
As awareness spread of the potential significance of Chinese competition for the exports 
of other developing countries, a number of academic papers and reports tried to evaluate 
the threat and to identify the countries which were most affected. These studies base 
their conclusions on a variety of indicators used to estimate the seriousness of the 
competitive threat from China. What they all have in common is that they measure  
the similarity between the export structure of the affected country and that of China, on 
the grounds that the greater the similarity, the more likely a country is to be negatively 
affected by Chinese competition. They also assume that an increase in the index over 
time represents increased competition while a fall implies greater complementarity 
between the trade structure of China and the affected country.  
This paper will argue that there are serious limitations to the measures that have been 
used which make them potentially misleading indicators of the severity of the   2
competitive threat to different countries and of changes in competition over time. The 
remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The next section presents the main indices 
that have been used in the recent literature on the impact of China on other developing 
countries and a summary of the main findings of such studies. Section 3 presents an 
analytical critique of these indices as measures of the competitive threat posed by 
China. Section 4 then develops two alternative measures, the static index of competitive 
threat (SICT) and the dynamic index of competitive threat (DICT) which it is argued 
give a more direct picture of the competition which a developing country faces from 
China and presents estimates of these indices for 18 developing countries. Section 5 
then compares these estimates with the traditional measures of export similarity to show 
that the latter underestimate the threat posed by China to other developing countries’ 
exports, particularly in the case of small, relatively specialized exporters. In Section 6 
the argument is extended to show that these new measures give a better indication of 
changes in the degree of competition which a country faces over time than the 
conventional indices. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main methodological 
advantages of the new measures and suggests ways in which they may prove useful in 
policy analysis. 
2  Previous studies of Chinese competition 
Two main kinds of indicators have been used in the literature to measure   
the competitive threat which China poses to exports from other developing countries. 
The first is Finger and Kreinin’s export similarity index and related indicators such as 
the  coefficient of specialization and the coefficient of conformity. The second are 
correlations either between the product structures of two countries’ exports or their 
patterns of revealed comparative advantage. This section briefly describes these 
indicators and the studies on Chinese competition which have used them. 
2.1  The export similarity index and related measures 
The best known measure is the export similarity index (ESI) which was first presented 
by Finger and Kreinin (1979) as a means of measuring the similarity of the exports of 
any two countries to a third market. The index is derived from the share of each product 
in each country’s total exports and is defined as the sum of the smaller value for each 
product. 
ESI = 100*∑iMIN(xi1, x i2)   (1) 
where x is the share of a commodity in exports, i is the product and 1 and 2 are the two 
countries for which the index is being calculated. The value of the index ranges from 0 
where there is no overlap between the products the two countries export and 100 when 
they have identical export structures. 
The ESI has been used by the Inter-American Development Bank to analyse the degree 
to which China competes with the exports of the Latin American countries and a sample 
of Asian economies (IDB 2004: table 5.6). It has also been used by Wu and Chen 
(2004) to analyse competition between China, Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN, by 
Schott (2004) for a large number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia   3
and the OECD, by Calderon (2006) for Latin America and by Jenkins and Edwards 
(2006) and Goldstein et al. (2006: table 14) in studies of China’s impact on Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Another index which has been applied in the literature on China is a modified form of 
the coefficient of specialization (Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso 2006). The 
standard format used in the economic geography literature is given as ∑| xi1 - x i2| which 
has a range from 0 when export structures are identical to 2 when they are totally 
dissimilar. In order to obtain a measure with a range from 0 to 100 the modified 
coefficient is calculated as 
CS = 100*(1 – ½∑| xi1 - x i2|)   (2) 
In fact this modified coefficient of specialization is identical to the ESI and will not 
therefore be considered separately.1 
An alternative measure also used by Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso (2006) is 
the coefficient of conformity (CC) which is based on the product of the market shares of 
the two countries rather than the differences between them. 
CC = 100*(∑i xi1x i2)/√( ∑i x
2
i1 ∑i x
2
 i2)   (3) 
As with the ESI and the coefficient of specialization, this index can vary between 0 
when two countries have no exports in common and 100 when they have identical 
export structures. The denominator in this coefficient is the product of the Herfindhal 
Index of commodity concentration of exports for the two countries. Blazquez-Lidoy, 
Rodriguez and Santiso (2006) find a high correlation between the coefficients of 
conformity and specialization (ESI) and also use a composite measure which is the 
arithmetic average of the two indices. 
The most complex index which has been used in the recent literature on China is the 
index of trade competition adopted by Meller and Contreras (2003). 
ITC = 100*∑i{( Xi1 + X i2)/ (∑i Xi1 + ∑i X i2)}*{1-(| xi1 - x i2|)/( xi1 + x i2)} (4) 
Where Xi represents the value of exports of product i and xi is again the share of product 
i in the country’s total exports. The first term measures the share of product i in the total 
exports of the two countries (i.e., the significance of the product) while the second is a 
modified coefficient of specialization (normalized by the share of product i in total 
trade). Once more, the index has a range from 0 when there is no overlap of exports to 
100 when the two countries have identical export structures. 
 
                                                 
1   The equivalence of the ESI and the CS can be shown as follows. If xi1 = x i2 +/- ai, the minimum value 
of xi will be xi1 - ai when xi1 > x i2 and xi1 when xi1< x i2 . Then ∑
n
i=1MIN(xi1, x i2) = ∑
n
i=1 xi1 - ∑
M
i=1 ai, 
where 1...M are those products where xi1 > xi2. Since ∑
n
i=1xi1 = 1 and ∑
M
i=1ai, = ½ ∑
n
i=1ai, this reduces 
to: 1 - ½ ∑
n
i=1 | xi1 - x i2| which is the ESI.   4
2.2  Correlation measures  
An alternative to the ESI and related measures based on differences between export 
shares or the product of export shares is to estimate the correlation between the trade 
patterns of two countries. The correlation between product shares in exports has been 
quite widely used in the literature on competition from China. Some studies use 
correlation coefficients while others use rank correlations. In both cases the value of the 
index ranges from +1 for countries with an identical export structure to -1 where the 
structures are totally dissimilar. Studies which have adopted this approach include Lall 
and Albaladejo (2004) and Ianchovichina, Suthiwart-Narueput and Zhao (2003) on East 
Asia; Lall and Weiss (2004), Moreira (2004) and Meller and Contreras (2003) on Latin 
America; and Jenkins and Edwards (2004) on eighteen countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
An alternative to correlating export shares between two countries is to use the 
correlation between their revealed comparative advantage (RCA) by product. The most 
common RCA index is the Balassa measure: 
RCA = xi1/x iw   (5)  
where xi1 is the share of product i in the exports of country 1 and xiw is the share of 
product i in total world exports. Shafaeddin (2004) uses rank correlations between the 
RCA of China and other countries by product to identify those countries which face 
most competition from China. Lederman, Olarreaga and Rubiano (2006) use an 
alternative RCA index developed by Vollrath (1991) to estimate competition between 
China and Latin America 
2.3  Findings of previous studies 
In contrast to the popular perception of the ‘Chinese threat’, most of these studies find 
that China’s impact on other developing countries’ exports to third markets is relatively 
limited with the competitive threat being confined to relatively few, mainly Asian, 
countries. 
While there is general agreement that the countries facing most competition from China 
are in Asia, there are differences regarding which countries are most at risk. Some 
studies have concluded that the Asian countries most threatened by Chinese competition 
are the more advanced East Asian countries (Meller and Contreras 2003; Schott 2004), 
while others see a greater threat to countries in South Asia which have specialized in 
labour-intensive manufactures and have not been able to upgrade their exports 
(Shafaeddin 2004). 
For other regions of the developing world, competition from China in third markets is 
not seen as a major problem. Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso (2006: 19) note 
that, In general terms the results suggest that there is no trade competition between 
China and Latin America’ and that ‘this competition is even decreasing rather than 
increasing over the recent period of time’. A recent World Bank study similarly 
concludes that ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’s trade specialization pattern is 
becoming more complementary to the specialization pattern of China’ (Lederman,   5
Olarreaga and Rubiano 2006: 16), echoing the earlier findings of Lall and Weiss 
(2005).2 Only Mexico is generally seen as an exception within Latin America. 
Even more than in Latin America, Africa is seen as largely unaffected by Chinese 
competition in third markets because of its limited development of manufactured 
exports. An OECD report finds very little overlap between exports from China and 
Africa, with the partial exception of South Africa (Goldstein et al. 2006: table 14). A 
recent World Bank report on the impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa does not even 
analyse this aspect preferring to concentrate on direct trade and investment links 
(Broadman 2007).  
3  A critique of the conventional indicators 
Although these indicators have been widely used to identify the countries which are 
most threatened by Chinese exports and whether competition from China is increasing 
or diminishing over time, neither the ESI-type measures nor correlations between export 
indicators provide a good measure of Chinese competition.  
3.1  ESI type measures 
The export similarity index was first introduced by Finger and Kreinin (1979) to analyse 
the impacts of trade policies, particularly the concessions granted to developing 
countries under the general system of preferences (GSP) and the effects of tariff 
reductions under GATT, on developing country exports. They argue that because the 
structure of developing countries’ exports differed from those of developed countries, 
they benefited relatively little from GATT reductions in tariffs which were concentrated 
on products exported by developed countries, and that the GSP did not lead to trade 
diversion from developed to developing countries. 
In this context a measure of the similarity in export structures between different 
countries is an appropriate indicator. The studies referred to in the previous section use 
the ESI to address a quite different question, namely the degree to which China 
competes in third markets with different countries and how this is changing over time. It 
might appear at first sight that the similarity of export structures between two countries 
is an appropriate measure of the degree of competition but on more careful 
consideration, this turns out not to be the case. 
Indices which measure the similarity between the exports of two countries by definition 
return a single value between a pair of countries. The exports of country A are as 
similar/dissimilar to those of country B, as those of country B are to those of country A. 
When the ESI is interpreted as an index of competition between two countries, then this 
implies that the competitive threat of country A to country B is the same as the 
competitive threat posed by country B to country A. Replace A by China and B by 
Honduras and the absurdity of this position becomes evident. No index which implies 
                                                 
2  ‘The direct thereat to exports to third country markets appears small: Latin American and the 
Caribbean’s (LAC’s) trade structure is largely complementary to that of China’ (Lall and Weiss 2005: 
163).    6
that Honduras is as much a competitive threat to China’s export markets as China is for 
Honduran exports is credible. 
The basic point here is that the ESI and related indices are measures of the similarity 
between the composition of the exports of the two countries being compared. This is 
underlined by Finger and Kreinin in their original article introducing the ESI when they 
write that, 
Since the index is intended to compare only patterns of exports across 
product categories, it should not be influenced by the relative sizes or 
scales of total exports. To remove the scale effect, the exports of, say a 
must be rescaled so that they are equal in total to those of b. (Finger and 
Kreinin 1979: 906) 
The removal of the scale effect is reflected in the use of the share of each product in 
total exports, rather than the value of exports in the indices discussed in the previous 
section.3 
This enables Finger and Kreinin and the other authors to calculate a single value to 
measure the similarity between the exports of any pair of countries. One can think of the 
similarity between the exports of two countries as the share of exports which are 
common to both countries expressed as a proportion of their combined exports. 
However, from the point of view of a country concerned about the competition it faces 
from China, what is relevant is the proportion of its own exports made up of products 
that compete with Chinese exports. The share of these products in China’s exports is of 
no relevance to it. It is quite possible that where the competing country is a small 
exporter, common products make up a substantial share of its own exports while only 
accounting for a small proportion of total Chinese exports. Appendix I presents this 
argument in diagrammatic form. 
The same argument can apply even if the value of exports of the two countries is similar 
but one country is much more specialized in those products which overlap. Again the 
overlapping set of exports represents a much greater proportion of the exports of the 
more specialized country than for the diversified exporter. In practice small exporters 
are likely to be more specialized than large ones so that the size and diversification 
effects are likely to reinforce each other. 
China’s exports in 2002 were almost US$300 billion, far more than those of any of the 
other countries included in this study. It exports almost twice as much in value terms as 
the second largest exporter, Mexico, and over 600 times as much as the smallest 
exporters (Ethiopia and Uganda) (see Statistical Appendix: Table A1). Table A1 also 
shows that China’s exports are more diversified than those of the other countries apart 
from Brazil, and considerably more diversified than those of the smaller exporters. An 
index which gives a single value for a pair of countries cannot possibly represent both 
the threat which China poses to Ethiopia’s exports and the threat from Ethiopia for 
China’s exports. 
                                                 
3   The only partial exception to this is the ITC where the first term of the equation does include absolute 
values of exports.   7
The implication of this is that the conventional indices are likely to underestimate the 
threat which China poses for smaller, less diversified exporters, relative to larger, more 
diversified ones. In fact where China is compared to a much smaller exporter, the 
conventional indices are a better measure of the threat that the smaller country poses to 
China’s exports than of the threat posed by China. It is intuitively obvious that a single 
index which is a weighted measure of the significance of the overlap between the 
exports of the two countries will be dominated by the larger exporter. 
ESI-type indicators are not only misleading in terms of ranking the competitive threat to 
different countries but also fail to provide an appropriate measure of changes in the 
competitive threat faced by a particular country over time. This again derives partly 
from the way in which the index only measures the similarity in the composition of 
exports between two countries. If over time the composition of exports in both countries 
remains unchanged, then the ESI does not change. Increased competition is implicitly 
equated with a convergence of export structures. However a major factor in the increase 
in competition from China in world markets is the extremely rapid growth of Chinese 
exports (and consequent increase in China’s share of world exports) over time. Because 
ESI-type indicators only take into account the shares of different products in total 
exports, they do not reflect the overall growth of exports which is a key feature of the 
competitive threat from China. 
If China’s export growth is associated with a diversification of its exports through 
expansion into new products not produced by its competitor, then the ESI falls. 
However this does not necessarily mean a reduction in competition in those products in 
which it previously competed. Indeed it may well be increasing its share in world 
markets for existing products as well, so that the picture obtained from the ESI suggests 
the opposite of what is really happening. 
3.2 Correlation  measures 
The basic criticism made of ESI-type indicators, that the indices provide a single value 
for any pair of countries, applies equally to those measures based on correlations 
between export shares or RCAs. Again what is being measured is the similarity between 
the composition of exports of the two countries rather than a meaningful indicator of the 
degree of competition between them. As with the ESI-type measures, the use of export 
shares or relative measures such as revealed comparative advantage, abstracts from the 
effect of differences in the size of exports between the two countries. 
There are some additional problems posed by the use of correlation coefficients. Where 
a country is highly specialized in a small number of exports, most observations will 
have a value of zero which will generate a very low correlation with the exports of a 
larger, more diversified exporter. It may also make the results highly dependent on a 
few outliers. This is particularly true where the Balassa version of the RCA is used since 
it has no upper limit and for small, highly specialized exporters, this leads to very high 
RCAs for the products which they export.4 
                                                 
4   In practice studies using RCAs have either used rank correlations (Shafaeddin 2004) or an alternative 
RCA measure which does have an upper limit (Lederman, Olarreaga and Rubiano 2006).   8
A further limitation of the correlation measures, even compared to ESI-type indicators, 
is that they do not provide an easy way of identifying the key industries in which two 
countries compete. The ESI can be decomposed so that the contribution of each product 
or group of products, to the overall index can be calculated. This is not possible in the 
case of correlation measures. 
Over time, correlation measures, like the ESI-type measures, can only indicate whether 
the composition of exports of two countries are converging or diverging. They do not 
provide an appropriate way of assessing whether competition between the two countries 
has intensified or reduced over a period. 
4  Alternative measures of the competitive threat from China 
4.1  The static and the dynamic index of competitive threat 
The extent to which a country faces a competitive threat from China depends not on the 
overall similarity of its export structure to that of China, but rather on the proportion of 
its total exports accounted for by products in which China is globally competitive. A 
country which has a high share of its exports in such products is threatened by Chinese 
competition even if the products concerned account for a relatively small share of 
China’s total exports so that the ESI would be relatively low. The higher the share of a 
country’s exports made up of such products, the greater the extent of the threat from 
China. Thus the index of competitive threat (ICT) can be defined simply as: 
ICT = 100*Σixi1 (6)   
where i = 1…m, which includes all products in which China is globally competitive. 
It remains then to identify those products in which China is a significant global 
competitor. There are a number of different ways in which this might be done. The 
standard approach in the literature to identifying products in which a country is 
internationally competitive is to use RCA. There are a number of different RCA 
measures but here we will only consider the Balassa RCA. All those 3-digit SITC 
products in which China has an RCA>1 were considered to be under competitive threat 
from China. The proportion of other countries’ exports that are accounted for by such 
products can then be calculated. This gives a static indicator of the extent to which a 
country’s exports are likely to be under threat from China. This will be referred to as the 
static index of competitive threat (SICT). 
An alternative approach is to identify those products where China’s exports are growing 
more rapidly than world trade as those in which other countries’ exports are facing a 
threat. This is somewhat similar to the approach used by Lall and Albaladejo (2004) 
who look at changes in world market shares of China and other countries. They 
explicitly relate their notion of ‘competitive threat’ to the business literature in which 
relative market share is a commonly used measure. 
The approach adopted here selects all products for which China’s exports grew faster 
than world exports between 1990 and 2002. In order to avoid including products in 
which China’s share of world exports was small and therefore the likely effect of   9
competition on other exporters limited, products where China’s share of world exports 
was less than 2 per cent in 2002 were excluded.5 Again the share of these products in 
each country’s total exports was calculated. This we will call the dynamic index of 
competitive threat (DICT).6 
These two indices are consistent with a common sense understanding of the extent of 
the competitive threat which a country faces from China in its export markets. They also 
clearly distinguishes between the competitive threat which a country faces from China 
and that which China faces, since the latter is measured by the proportion of Chinese 
exports accounted for by products in which the other country is globally competitive. 
Although the new indicators do not explicitly take into account the scale of a country’s 
exports in estimating the competitive threat (except indirectly in so far as scale is 
correlated with diversification of exports), they avoid the bias which exists in traditional 
measures as a result of using a single indicator of export similarity. 
3.2  Empirical estimates of the SICT and DICT 
The two new indicators, the static and the dynamic index of competitive threat, were 
estimated using data on the exports of China and 18 developing countries, six each from 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, available from Jenkins and Edwards (2004).7 Although 
not a random selection of developing countries, the 18 represent a range of countries in 
terms of region, size, level of development, scale and diversification of exports (see 
Statistical Appendix, Table A1 for a listing of the countries and some key indicators).  
Export data were obtained for the world, China and each of the 18 countries from 
Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer (WTA) for 1996 and 2002. This is based on 
UN COMTRADE data which has been reanalyzed to create a consistent set of trade 
statistics between countries. Since many of the previous studies have used the standard 
international trade classification at the 3-digit level to study China’s export competition, 
this was the classification used here. It should be noted that the measured degree of 
competitive threat will depend on the level of disaggregation of the data, both in terms 
of products (2, 3, 4 digit SITC for example) and markets (world, major regions, 
individual countries). It is possible that China and other developing countries export 
different products within the same 3-digit SITC classification, so that more 
disaggregated data would result in a lower estimate of the share of exports which face 
competition from China and this caveat should be borne in mind.8  
                                                 
5   The choice of a 2 per cent cut off point for the share of China’s exports in the world market is 
somewhat arbitrary. Sensitivity analysis however showed that setting the share at either half or double 
this level would not change the proportion of China’s exports that were regarded as posing a 
competitive threat by very much.  
6   A similar measure was previously used by the author in Jenkins and Edwards (2004, 2006). 
7   We are grateful to the UK Department for International Development which commissioned Jenkins 
and Edwards (2004). 
8   Important though this may be in empirical work, it applies to all the indices discussed and therefore 
does not affect the central argument of this paper that the main indicators that have been used in the 
literature are inherently inappropriate irrespective of the level of aggregation of the data to which they 
are applied.   10
Table 1 
Share of exports under threat, 2002 
 SICT  DICT  China’s  SICT 
Bangladesh 97  92  23 
Cambodia 95  97  17 
India 43  54  35 
Indonesia 42  55  42 
Pakistan 82  92  27 
Vietnam 60  61  30 
Cameroon 3  23  3 
Ethiopia 27  26  3 
Mozambique 17  67  4 
Nigeria 2  2  2 
South Africa  33  47  17 
Uganda 34  41  4 
Bolivia 17  21  5 
Brazil 23  39  15 
Honduras 34  49  12 
Mexico 49  64  52 
Nicaragua 26  30  7 
Peru 23  39  13 
Note:   Columns (1) and (2) represent the share of the listed country’s total exports which are under 
threat from China. Column (3) represents the share of China’s exports which are under threat 
from the listed country. 
Source:  Own elaboration from WTA data. 
The first two columns of Table 1 show the SICT and the DICT which China represents 
for each of the 18 countries. Those countries for which China represents the most severe 
threat, with over 80 per cent of exports accounted for by products in which China is 
internationally competitive, were Bangladesh, Cambodia and Pakistan. At the other 
extreme, Nigeria and Cameroon had virtually no exports that competed with China, not 
surprisingly given the significance of oil exports for both countries. It is worth noting, 
however, that in contrast to the commonly held view, an important share of other African 
countries’ exports are of products which compete with China, as are those of several Latin 
American countries. Although not on the same scale as in Asia, between a quarter and a 
half of exports of a number of countries in these regions face Chinese competition. 
The third column of Table 1 shows the proportion of China’s exports accounted for by 
products in which each of the 18 countries has a revealed comparative advantage 
(Balassa RCA>1).9 Thus whereas 97 per cent of Bangladesh’s exports are of products in 
which China has an RCA>1, only 23 per cent of China’s exports are of products in 
which Bangladesh has an RCA>1. The only country, of the 18, in which the share of its 
exports accounted for by products in which China is globally competitive is less than 
the share of China’s exports in which it has a comparative advantage, is Mexico. The 
very large differences for most countries between the values in columns (1) and (3) 
underline the point made earlier that a single index measuring the similarity of export 
structures cannot adequately capture both the notion of the competitive threat posed by 
China to another country’s exports and the threat which that country poses to China’s 
exports. 
                                                 
9   This is the SICT for China with respect to the competitive threat posed by each of the 18 countries.   11
3.3 Diagrammatic  presentation 
The proposed static measure of the competitive threat posed by China can be illustrated 
visually by comparing the values of RCA for China and its competitor.10 A bubble 
diagram can show four quadrants according to whether China and its competitor have 
RCAs greater than or less than one. The size of the bubble can also be used to indicate 
the value of exports of each product by the threatened country. Figure 1 illustrates this 
for the case of Bangladesh. 
What is immediately apparent is the extent to which Bangladesh’s exports are 
concentrated in the north-east quadrant of the diagram, indicating that they are products 
in which China also has a revealed comparative advantage. The diagram also highlights 
the degree to which Bangladesh’s exports are concentrated in a relatively small number 
of products (a small number of large bubbles). It is clear that Bangladesh is highly 
threatened by competition from China.  
Figure 2 provides a similar picture but this time the bubbles represent the value of 
China’s exports of products according to combinations of RCA in Bangladesh and 
China. This shows that the largest proportion of China’s exports is in the south-east 
quadrant of the diagram i.e. products in which Bangladesh does not have a comparative 
advantage. As mentioned above, less than a quarter of the value of China’s exports is of 
products in which Bangladesh is globally competitive. 
Figure 1 
Bangladesh exports and competition with China 
 
 
                                                 
10 A similar visual presentation could be provided for the DICT but for reasons of space this has not been 
done here. 
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Figure 2  
Chinese exports and competition with Bangladesh 
 
 
5  Comparing measures of the competitive threat from China 
Having estimated the new indices of competitive threat and shown how they provide 
different estimates for the threat from and to China for other countries, these indices 
will be compared with the results obtained using traditional indicators. In order to do 
this on a systematic basis, the same data for China and 18 developing countries were 
used to estimate a range of different measures (see Statistical Appendix, Table A2 for a 
listing of the countries and the values for each indicator).  
Two issues can be addressed in looking at the relationship between the new indices and 
those used in previous studies. First, do they give a consistent ranking of countries in 
terms of the degree of competition which they face from China? Second, do they give 
approximately similar estimates of the level of competition from China faced by a 
particular country? 
Table 2 
Rank correlations between indices for 18 countries, 2002 
 SICT  DICT 
X share  0.73  0.78 
Rank RCA  0.75  0.62 
ESI 0.63  0.54 
CC 0.79  0.73 
ITC 0.50  0.34 
SICT 1  0.80 
Source: Statistical Appendix, Table A1. 
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To analyse the first question, Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated 
between the two indicators and each of the conventional indices. The results are 
presented in Table 2.  
It is worth noting that the two new measures introduced here are highly correlated with 
each other. However, they are not so well correlated with some of the earlier indicators 
that have been used, especially the ITC and the ESI. The correlation between the DICT 
and the ITC is insignificant and the correlation between the DICT and the ESI is only 
significant at the 5 per cent level as is that between the SICT and ITC.11 
Inspection of the data reveals that there are some important changes in the ranking of 
countries according to the index which is adopted. Most striking is the rise of 
Bangladesh and Cambodia which emerge as the countries most threatened by China 
according to the two new indices, whereas they appear to be in the middle of the range 
of countries according to the ESI and the ITC. Mexico on the other hand, which is the 
country most threatened by China according to all the traditional indices apart from the 
correlation between RCA ranks falls to fifth place on both the new indices. Similarly 
Indonesia, which is the second most exposed country according to the ESI, coefficient 
of conformity and the ITC, falls to seventh or eighth place in terms of the two new 
indicators. Since Mexico and Indonesia are relatively large, diversified exporters, while 
Bangladesh and Cambodia are much smaller, highly specialized exporters (see 
Statistical Appendix, Table A1), this confirms the bias identified earlier in the 
discussion of the limitations of the traditional indicators. 
These correlations only relate to consistency in the ranking of different countries 
according to the threat from China They say nothing about the absolute level of this 
threat for particular countries and how far the measures accurately capture this. In order 
to test for consistency in this narrower sense, regressions were run for the pairs of 
indices. If the various indices returned consistent absolute values for the threat of 
competition from China, then the resulting linear regression should have an intercept 
not significantly different from zero and a slope not significantly different from 1.12  
These throw further doubt on the consistency of the traditional measures and the new 
indices introduced in the last section. Both the ESI and the ITC are very poorly 
correlated with the SICT and the DICT and the regression coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent level (see Table 3). Furthermore, for all the 
regressions the slope of the regression line was significantly less than unity, indicating 
                                                 
11   Critical values for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient with 18 observations are 0.564 at the  
1 per cent level and 0.399 at the 5 per cent level. 
12  One issue here is that whereas the ESI, coefficient of conformity and ITC are measured on a scale of 
0-100, the export share and rank RCA are correlation coefficients taking a value between -1 and 1. A 
first step is to rescale the ESI and related measures from 0-100 to 0-1. It was decided not to rescale the 
correlation coefficients because it was observed that although theoretically these could take a value of 
-1, the lowest observed value was in fact -0.1. The inclusion of a constant term in the regressions was 
used to capture the fact that the different measures might not have a common origin.   14
that the traditional indices tended to underestimate the extent to which Chinese exports 
competed with those of the other 18 countries compared with the new measures.13 
In summary, therefore, the traditional indices that have been used in measuring the 
competitive threat from China underestimate the absolute extent to which a country’s 
exports are threatened by China. They also introduce systematic biases into the ranking 
of countries by inflating the threat to larger, more diversified exporters, relative to 
smaller exporters with a narrower range of exports.  
Table 3 
Relationship between different Indicators 
 SICT  DICT 
 Slope  Intercept  R
2  Slope 
  Intercept R
2 
X Share  0.47** 
 (0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
0.57   0.50** 
(0.12) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.53 
Rank RCA  0.49** 
 (0.11) 
-0.07  
(0.05) 
0.55   0.51** 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
0.51 
ESI 0.22** 
(0.12) 
0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.16   0.25** 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.18 
CC 0.43** 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.51   0.45** 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.48 
ITC 0.14** 
(0.14) 
0.16* 
(0.07) 
0.06   0.17** 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.08 
Notes:   Standard error of the slope coefficient in brackets; 
  * significantly different from zero at 5 per cent; ** significantly different from 1 at 5 per cent level. 
Source:  As for Table 2. 
6  Changes in the competitive threat from China over time 
In addition to comparing the level of threat from China to the exports of different 
countries at a point in time, the various indices have also been used to look at changes 
over time. If the structure of exports of China and its competitors are becoming 
increasingly similar then it is assumed that the threat posed by China is increasing, 
while divergence of export structures would indicate a diminution of the threat. Given 
the emergence of China as a global player in recent years, it would be expected that 
many countries would have faced an increased competitive threat. Some countries that 
specialize in primary commodities in which China is not internationally competitive 
would be relatively unaffected, but for other countries China would present an increased 
challenge. 
In order to see how far the various measures reflect this, the different indices were 
calculated for 1996 for each country and then compared with the previously calculated 
indices for 2002 (Statistical Appendix, Table A3). The first surprise from the data is the 
relatively small number of cases in which the index increased for the traditional 
measures. Taking those cases in which the index increased by more than 2, on a scale 
                                                 
13 In most cases the hypothesis that the constant term was zero could not be rejected. In this case a slope 
coefficient of less than 1 implies that on average the value of the traditional index is less than the 
value of the new index with which it is being compared.   15
from 0 to 100 (or 0.02 for the correlation coefficients), as facing a significant increase in 
competition from China, the number varied from three in the case of the correlation 
between RCAs to five for the coefficient of conformity (see Table 4). For each of these 
indicators, more countries faced less competition from China in 2002 compared to 1996, 
than faced increased competition. 
The last two rows of Table 4, which show our alternative indices, present a rather 
different picture. Almost half of the eighteen countries are now seen to face increasing 
competitive pressure from China and only five or six have seen competition fall.  
Looking at the changes in the indices for individual countries reveals some further 
interesting results (see Statistical Appendix, Table A3). The only country which appears 
to face increased competition on all the indices is Mexico. Bangladesh, where the share of 
exports facing competition from China increased between 1996 and 2002, is less 
threatened in 2002 than in 1996 according to all the conventional indices apart from the 
rank RCA, while Cambodia, the country where the share of exports competing with China 
increased most over the period, shows a reduction in both the ESI and the ITC. Ethiopia, 
where the proportion of exports accounted for by products which compete with China 
also increased, shows no significant change in any of the conventional indices. 
Looking at changes over time in the indices, therefore, raises further doubts as to 
whether the traditional measures of export similarity are a useful way of measuring the 
competitive threat from China to other developing country exporters. 
Table 4 
Numbers of countries in which competition from China increased or fell, 1996-2002 
  Increased competition  Little change  Reduced competition 
Correlation of X share  4 6  8 
Correlation of RCA  3 3  12 
ESI  4 7  7 
Coefficient of conformity  5 4  9 
Coefficient of ITC  4 6  8 
SICT  8 5  5 
DICT  9 4  5 
Note:   Competition is considered to have increased if the relevant index rose by more than 2 (0.02 in 
the case of the correlation coefficients) and to have reduced if it fell by more than 2. 
Source:   Statistical Appendix, Table A3. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the main indices which have been used as measures of the 
competitive threat from China are inherently flawed. The principal reason for this is that 
the indices measure the similarity between the export structures of China and its 
competitors. Where China’s exports are much larger and more diversified than those of 
its competitor, these indices tend to underestimate the extent to which the competitor’s 
exports are threatened. This leads to distortions in both the rankings of countries 
according to the extent to which they face competition from China and the direction of 
change in the competitive threat over time.   16
The paper has also developed two alternative indices to measure the extent of Chinese 
competition, the static and the dynamic index of competitive threat. These have several 
advantages over the indices used in previous studies. First and foremost, they 
distinguish between the threat which China poses to another country from the threat that 
the other country poses to China, rather than conflating them into one measure. Second, 
they are not biased by differences in the value of exports from the two countries 
concerned, or by differences in the commodity concentration of their exports. Third, 
since they measure the proportion of a country’s exports accounted for by products in 
which China is internationally competitive, the meaning of a particular value of the 
index is easy to understand, which is not the case with some of the other indices. Fourth, 
they identify very clearly the key products for which a country faces competition from 
China. Finally, they are relatively economical in terms of data requirements and 
complexity of calculation once RCAs and changes in world market shares for China 
have been obtained.  
By providing a more realistic measure of the extent to which countries face competition 
from China, these indicators can inform national policy. Where there is a substantial 
threat to exports, this provides added urgency to the need to promote competitiveness or 
to find market niches less exposed to Chinese competition. This is facilitated by the ease 
with which products that are most threatened can be identified. This can be refined by 
using more disaggregated data both at product and market levels. At the global level, the 
paper suggests that the disruption to the trade of developing countries caused by the 
emergence of China is likely to be far greater than has been recognized up to now. This 
implies that there may be a greater need for adjustment measures or preferential trading 
arrangements to limit the negative impacts on other developing regions. 
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Appendix I: A diagrammatic illustration of the problems of a single indicator 
of export similarity14 
Intuitively one can think of the ESI and similar indices diagrammatically as representing 
the overlap between the two countries’ sets of exports. 
Figure I.1 represents the two countries’ exports as circles. The two circles are drawn of 
equal size to illustrate Finger and Kreinin’s point that exports should be rescaled so that 
they are equal in total for the two countries. In part A there are no goods which are 
exported by both countries so that the two sets do not overlap and the various indices of 
export similarity have a value of zero. In part B there is significant overlap and so the 
index takes a value between zero and 100. Where, as in the figure, the overlap is half of 
each country’s exports, then the various indices will be around 50.15 Part C represents 
the situation in which the structure of exports for the two countries is identical so that 
the circles overlap completely. This is the situation where the index is 100. 
This diagrammatic presentation helps to clarify a fundamental flaw in using the ESI as a 
measure of competition between China and other countries. Figure I.1 illustrates a 
situation in which the two countries are symmetrical in that the level of exports are set 
to be equal and therefore the overlap between the two sets of exports is the same for 
both countries, giving a single value for the index. 
Figure I.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.2 
            
            
             
                                                 
14 I am indebted to John Thoburn for suggesting this diagrammatic presentation. 
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Figure I.2 illustrates a situation in which differences in the scale of exports between the 
two countries are explicitly recognized by drawing the circles proportionate to the value 
of their exports. As before A, B and C represent different levels of overlap between the 
exports of the two countries. A will again be a situation in which there is no similarity 
between the countries’ exports and the index will be zero. In parts B and C, the 
implications of differences in scale can be seen. In B the overlap represents about 5 per 
cent of the exports of the larger country but 50 per cent of the exports of the smaller, 
while in C all the exports of the smaller country compete with those of the larger 
country, but these only represent 10 per cent of the latter’s exports. It is clear that a 
single value index cannot represent the competitive threat faced by both countries. 
Although the above discussion is presented in terms of export similarity type indices, 
the criticism applies equally to measures based on correlations between export share or 
RCAs. In this case Figure I.1 above can be re-interpreted so that part A represents a 
situation in which r
2 =0 and part C is where r
2 = 1 (see Gujarati 2003: 82).  
                                                                                                                                               
15 This is an approximation since the exact value of the index will depend on the share of the individual 
products exported by both countries in the total exports of each country.    20
Statistical appendix 
Appendix Table A1 
Basic indicators for 18 countries, 2002 
  GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$) 
Exports 
($mn.) 
Export 
 concentration* 
China 1106.0  299,221  0.154 
Bangladesh 372.7  6,442  0.388 
Cambodia 305.9  1,909  0.456 
India 480.0  56,255  0.186 
Indonesia 844.3  61,264  0.181 
Pakistan 532.0  10,550  0.273 
Vietnam 255.0  16,847  0.285 
Cameroon 708.7  1,825  0.525 
Ethiopia 126.0  496  0.417 
Mozambique 247.4 940  0.585 
Nigeria 357.8  18,628  0.788 
South Africa  3121.6  26,982  0.167 
Uganda 443.7  488  0.343 
Bolivia 1010.4  1,400  0.303 
Brazil 3473.4  63,604  0.148 
Honduras 932.2  1,820  0.253 
Mexico 5853.0  169,650  0.186 
Nicaragua 791.0  694  0.237 
Peru 2085.4  7,791  0.293 
Note:   * Herfindhal Index of commodity concentration of exports. 
Source:   World Bank (WDI) for the GDP per capita; WTA for exports. 
Appendix Table A2 
Measures of Chinese competition for 18 countries, 2002 
  X share  Rank RCA  ESI  CC  ITC  SICT  DICT 
Bangladesh  0.34  0.40  21 37 15 97 92 
Cambodia 0.37  0.23  18 39 11 95 97 
India 0.10  0.27  40 24 40 43 54 
Indonesia 0.32  0.35  47 43 52 42 55 
Pakistan 0.23  0.28  32 31 27 82 92 
Vietnam 0.26  0.46  38 33 39 60 61 
Cameroon -0.02  -0.05  6 3 6 3  23 
Ethiopia -0.05  0.08  6  2  6 27 26 
Mozambique -0.01  0.04  6  4  6 17 67 
Nigeria -0.01  -0.10  4 3 3 2 2 
South Africa  0.03  -0.02  31 20 33 33 47 
Uganda -0.05  -0.08  9  4  9 34 41 
Bolivia -0.05  -0.07  13  5 14 17 21 
Brazil 0.07  -0.03  32 25 33 23 39 
Honduras 0.00  -0.01  17 11 16 34 49 
Mexico 0.49  0.29  54 57 55 49 64 
Nicaragua -0.06  -0.06  17  7 17 26 30 
Peru -0.02  0.18  19  8 19 23 39 
Note:   The first two columns of the table show correlation coefficients between the variable for China 
and the listed country. The remaining columns show indices which can vary from 0 to 100. 
Source:   Own elaboration from WTA data.   21
Appendix Table A3 
Change in measures of competition from China, 1996-2002 
  X share  Rank RCA  ESI  CC  ITC  SICT  DICT 
Bangladesh  -0.15   0.02   -6   -13   -6   9   7  
Cambodia 0.11    0.07   -6   6   -12   48   32  
India -0.10    -0.11   -5   -11   -5   -4   -3  
Indonesia 0.00    -0.08   2   0   4   3   1  
Pakistan -0.11    -0.10   -1   -9   -2   2   2  
Vietnam -0.21    -0.02   -2   -18   -0   4   3  
Cameroon -0.09    -0.03   -4   -11   -3   -2   4  
Ethiopia 0.01    -0.00   -0   1   -1   19   8  
Mozambique 0.00    0.07   -5   -2   -6   -28   47  
Nigeria -0.14    -0.05   -1   -12   -0   1   0  
South Africa  0.05   -0.03   -0   3   1   -0   -2  
Uganda -0.00    -0.10   6   4   6   24   29  
Bolivia -0.01    -0.15   -3   -5   -2   -6   -7  
Brazil 0.04    -0.08   -2   0   -1   -4   -4  
Honduras 0.02    -0.07   0   4   -2   11   15  
Mexico 0.20    0.08   7   16   8   14   6  
Nicaragua -0.02    -0.13   4   -2   7   -10   -10  
Peru -0.02    -0.01   -3   -4   -2   -2   -4  
Source:  Own elaboration from WTA data. 